For many individual countries, the option of farming more land does not exist in practice.In contrast, increasing productivity currently presents a more sustainable approach to food security. Still, the overall pattern is familiar—as incomes rise, urbanization and women’s education and employment rise as well, and all of these factors produce a decline in desired family size and increases in birth spacing, producing lower fertility. Unless that decline significantly accelerates, Africa as a whole would not reach replacement fertility of 2.1 children per woman for 110 years, well into the next century.The UN medium variant projection generally assumes that countries with higher fertility will shift to a more rapid decline in coming years. Third, in the next few decades we expect unprecedented urban growth, particularly in Africa and Asia. In this model, fertility is affected most strongly by desired family size, though the effect of birth interval is also highly significant. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that in 2050 the global meat production will increase to 455 million tons. That's thanks to a fertility rate of 4.3 per woman. In middle Africa, which had fertility of about six children per woman in the 1950s, fertility continued to Because these tropical regions dominate Africa in terms of population, overall fertility for sub-Saharan Africa remains at 5.1 children per woman in 2010–2015, and at 4.72 for Africa as a whole. In Asia and Latin America, fertility was similar to that in Africa in the 1950s, with about six children born per woman during her lifetime. That was only twice the population of Japan, and only about one-third the population of Europe. Across all these countries, female enrollment ratios never reach even 50%.To be sure, female education is not a necessary and sufficient condition for fertility decline. In particular, Asia will contribute a staggering 41 percent and Africa 47 percent towards this growth in 2050 (Fig. note:As long as extended families provide working women (not only agricultural workers, but ones in urban areas having paid employment as well) with relatives who are willing to come and assist with household tasks and child care, paid female employment may not only make a far smaller contribution to fertility decline in tropical Africa than that observed in other regions, but it may also actually delay fertility reduction in Africa by slowing the trend toward the nuclear family system.Korotayev et al. Moreover, such secondary education as is provided goes mainly to boys, with girls having a significant gap. In Niger in 1998, for example, women who completed secondary education had 31% fewer children (on average, 4.6 per lifetime) than those who completed only primary education (6.7). Women who leave school after primary education, which ends at age 12, are readily available for very early marriage and have no distinctive skills that allow them to be more productive or stand up to their husbands. We have chosen the years between 1950-2050 for our Pyramid to show a balance of historical and future projections. That age structure still characterizes almost all of sub-Saharan Africa today.Richard Cincotta has found that the chance of a country being a stable democracy exceeds 50% only once it has progressed in its demographic transition to the point where its median age is 29.5; the chances of being a stable democracy rise to 80% when median age reaches 35.Aside from the small island states of Mauritius, Reunion, and the Seychelles (median age 35), as of 2015 no countries in Africa except for Tunisia (31) had reached a median age of 30. In addition, he found an “Africa effect” such that for any level of development indicators, fertility was about one child per woman higher than in other developing countries. As the majority of fertile land is already under crop production, expansion of arable land will be limited to some regions only.In 2050, the arable land will increase by about 200 million hectares, mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. This suggests that the vulnerability of countries with a very young population was not merely a result of the large numbers of institutionally weak states in the early stages of industrialization. The variation in the continent is too great.Africa today includes giant countries with populations near or exceeding 100 million (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria) and tiny countries with populations under 1 million (Comoros, Djibouti, Cabo Verde, Reunion, Mayotte, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles). The alternative, if this is delayed, is a vicious cycle in which fertility continues to decline slowly or stall, spurring continued growth of the young population, making it harder to provide secondary education for all youth, and leaving less to invest in workers.Africa has plenty of scope to increase its agricultural productivity and release workers for manufacturing and service jobs.
Masse Volumique Hydrogène, Taxi Aéroport Marseille La Ciotat, Abonnement Ter Toulouse Montauban, Opodo Annulation Vol Coronavirus, Rtl Jeux Les Grosses Têtes, Benjamin Castaldi, Simon Castaldi,